The Use of the Radioactive Material Depleted Uranium U-238 (DU) in Military Weapons
By Damacio A. Lopez
IDUST

Presented to The European Parliament, in Strasbourg, France - October 25, 2000

 The United States military uses radioactive materials such as depleted uranium U-238 (DU) in various weapons. These nuclear variants are used in weapons as; armor-piercing bullets, casing for bombs, shielding on tanks, counter weights and ground penatrators on missiles, fragments in cluster bombs, fragments in anti-personnel mines and in other weapons.1 NATO forces have used such weapons in combat since the Persian Gulf War, and most recently in Yugoslavia. It is not clear whether the nuclear variants were included in all of these weapons during combat. However, this information can be obtained by sampling soils where these weapons have been used.

 DU is the waste product left after natural uranium has gone through the gaseous diffusion process in the attempt to remove the fissionable isotope U-235. The U.S. military calls this waste product depleted uranium or DU.

 DU is a highly toxic heavy metal with a radioactive half-life of four and one-half billion years. It is very appealing in military weapons because of its heavy weight and pyrophoric qualities which cause it to burn like a cutting torch through steel when a DU penetrator strikes a hard target. It is this pyrophoric quality that makes this material so horrific, the burning of DU creates respirable size radioactive dust that can have short and long term health effects on the human body, such as kidney problems, birth defects, cancers and death. Countries where DU is suspected to be part of the military arsenal or has been contaminated by DU, included are;

 Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bahrain, Bolivia, Bosnia, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Oman, Portugal, Panama, Pakistan, Poland, Puerto Rico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, South Korea, Sudan, Taiwan, Turkey, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia.2

 DU has accumulated in enormous quantities since the dawn of the nuclear age. It is estimated that there is one million tons of DU in the world.3Despite the name "Depleted" Uranium, DU has 60% the radioactivity of natural uranium, which is pure uranium. "Uranium occurs in soils at an average concentration of 3 parts per million."4 Other than a lower U-235 content, the nuclear, chemical and metallurgical properties of depleted and natural uranium are essentially identical.5

 DU has become internationally recognized as a health hazard. It is a suspected environmental contaminant in more than 50 sites across the U.S.6 and on battlefields in many countries. Affected communities experience health problems similar to those of Gulf War veterans7 and Iraqi civilians.8

 Since the 1950s weapons containing DU have been tested and developed near communities across the U.S.. One such community is Socorro, New Mexico where DU open air testing began in 1972 and ended in 1993 after pressure from a local citizens group called "Save our Mountain."9

 This material which is waste and would cost the Department of Energy billions of dollars to put in nuclear dumps is now provided free of charge for military use and to private industry. Since 1985 Manufacturing Sciences Corporation has converted over 6 million pounds of DU into 70,000 commercial products.10

 Weapons containing DU are considered illegal under international laws governing weapons of war. Weapons must meet these four criteria under existing international humanitarian and human rights law in armed conflict;

1) weapons must be able to be limited in effect to the field of battle (the territorial limitation),
2) weapons must be limited in effect to the time period of the armed conflict (the temporal limitation),
3) weapons must not be unduly inhumane (the humanity limitation),
4) weapons must not unduly damage the environment (the environmental limitation).11

 DU in military weapons are inherently illegal under this criteria. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights Sub-commission On Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, "Urges all states to be guided in their international policies by the need to curb the production and spread of weapons of mass destruction and indiscriminate effect, in particular, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, fuel air bombs, napalm, cluster bombs, biological weaponry and weaponry containing depleted uranium"12

 The Pentagon has been selling excess and obsolete stocks of brass covered shells that include 50-caliber armor-piercing rounds for $1 a ton to Talon Manufacturing Company. Last year Talon sold more that 100,000 armor-piercing 50 caliber rounds on the open market. The buyers ranged from the militaries of Brazil and Colombia to civilian weapons dealers in the U.S.. Gun dealers boast that the projectile will go through six inches of steel up to a 45-degree angle at 1,000 yards. The 50-caliber guns are considered accurate at 2,000 yards and can hit targets 4 miles away with some effectiveness. Talon even sold 35,000 rounds of the refurbished 50-caliber armor-piercing projectiles back to the U.S. military.13The U.S. military arsenal includes a 50-caliber DU armor-piercing projectile.

 Human populations exposed to DU contamination.

 1) People who reside near facilities that process or are involved in the research, development and testing of DU.
 2) Combatants and civilians in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1990/1991 GulfWar).
 3) Combatants and civilians in Bosnia (1994/1995 war).
 4) Combatants and civilians in Yugoslavia and the surrounding Balkan region (1999 war).
 5) Combatants and civilians in the Israeli Conflict (2000/Continues).

 Where did it all begin?

 Author of the book, Inside the Third Reich, Albert Speer, writes, "In the summer of 1943, wolframite imports from Portugal were cut off, which created a critical situation for the production of solid-core ammunition I there upon ordered the use of uranium cores for this type of ammunition. My release of our uranium stocks of about twelve hundred metric tons showed that we no longer had any thoughts of producing atomic bombs."14

 On October 30, 1943 the U.S. War Department proposed the "Use of Radioactive Materials as a Military Weapon," in a 1974 declassified document to Brigadier General L. R. Groves. Two objectives were recommended in this proposal. 1) As a terrain contaminating material, the radioactive product would be spread on the ground and would affect personnel. 2) As a gas warfare instrument, the material would be ground into particles of microscopic size to form dust and smoke and distributed by a ground-fired projectile, land vehicle, or aerial bombs. In this form it would be inhaled by personnel.15

 In 1959 the U.S. Air Force conducted what amounted to eight intentional meltdown of small nuclear reactors in the Utah desert, "Resulting radiation clouds were tracked by sensors placed up to 20 miles downwind and across a 210-square-mile area at Dugway Proving Ground." The total amount of radiation released by the tests was 14 times more than the infamous Three Mile Island accident.16

 On October 21, 1994 an Interim Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments described intentional releases of radioactive materials into populated areas prior to 1963. "Experiments involving intentional environmental releases of radiation that (A) were designed to test human health effects of ionizing radiation; or (B) were designed to test the extent of human exposure to ionizing radiation." These releases were generally related to radiation warfare tests, the gathering of intelligence, and the development of instruments. Four such tests were conducted at Los Alamos, New Mexico, however the Department of Energy reports that the number of such tests approximates 250.17

 In 1999 the Institute of Medicine published a 139 page book entitled, Potential Radiation Exposure in Military Operations, for use by the U.S. Army, "In it, the committee considers technical and ethical aspects of military radiation protection and safety policies applicable in instances of the potential exposure of military personnel to radiation doses that are less than those that cause acute effects but that are associated with a long-term risk of subsequent cancers.18A military scenario considered is the limited nuclear exchanges, such as, conventional explosives employed as a means of disseminating radioactive materials.19 This publication is critical of the ACE Directive (NATO, 1996) p. A-120 which states:

 Dose is uniform to the entire body due to whole-body irradiation. This table does not consider the intake of radioactive material. This is assumed due to employment of effective respiratory protection and other measures.21

 The committee state that," The ACE directive assumes that the respiratory protection is 100 percent effective and is silent on situations in which protective equipment is not worn or is defective. The ACE directive does not specify, quantitatively, at what level of radiological contamination the protective mask should be worn."22 The report also contains this statement." The committee commends the Office of the U.S. Army Surgeon General for the steps it has taken to protect American soldiers.23 American Soldiers were not informed that they were using weapons containing DU until two weeks after the Gulf War ended.24  Over 250,000 returning Americans Gulf War troops have reported to veterans hospitals asking for medical help for what has become known as the Gulf War Syndrome.25

 After the Gulf War, Iraqi medical scientists did extensive health studies of civilians and soldiers who may have been exposed to DU and found that cancers and birth defects were ten times higher than the levels experienced before the Gulf War.26

 The use of radioactive materials in military weapons is morally and legally unacceptable in a civilized society.

1. Van Etten D.M. and Purty, W.D., "Depleted Uranium Investigation at Missile Sites in White Sands Missile Range," Los Alamos National Laboratory, January, 1994:49.
1. U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute (USAEPI), "Health and Environmental Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use by the U.S. Army," Summary Report to Congress, June, 1994.
1. Ikenberry, T.A., "Evaluation of the Depleted Uranium Hazard from SRAM 11 Missile Testing, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Presented to the California Coastal Commission, April 8-9, 1991.
1. Davidson, L., "Weapons Testing Documents Listed For Dugway Proving Grounds," Desert News, October 22, 1999.
1. Naval Air Warfare Center, "Tomahawk Flight Test Operations on the West Coast of the United States," Final Environmental Assessment, October, 1998.

2. Hindman, N., "Commercial and Government-to-Government Sales," Defense Trade News, V. 4 nos, January/April, 1993:30.
2. U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute (USAEPI), "Health and Environmental Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use by the U.S. Army," Summary Report to Congress, June, 1994.
2. Presidential Document, "Military Sales of Depleted Uranium Ammunition," Federal Register Vol. 59, No. 145, July 29, 1994.
2. WISE, "Depleted Uranium Proliferation," Amsterdam, Holland, WISE 403, March 12, 1993.
2. Bautista, J. and Tores, Q.T., Directors of Comunidad Original Indigena Aymara Amuqala, letter to Lieutenant Colonel Waldo Molina, Comendante Del Regimiento Boliva, ref: Denuncia Sobre Danos Ocasionados En Las Praticas De Artilleria, January 20, 2000.
2. Boustany, N., "Defense Tango," Washington Post, June 11, 1999:A16.
2. LAKA "International Conference Against Depleted Uranium Weapons" Manchester England, November 4-5, 2000.

3. PNEWS Progressive New and Views, "Iraq: U.S. Used Radioactive ARMS," May 20, 1995.

4. Rostker, B., "Environmental Exposure Report," Depleted Uranium in the Gulf, Department Of Defense, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illness, July 31, 1998.

5. Peterson, W. D., "TERA Request for Amendment to License No. NM-INT-DU-07," New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Socorro, New Mexico, November 17, 1998.

6. Bukowski, G., Lopez, D.A. and McGehee, F.M., "Uranium Battlefields Home and Abroad: Depleted Uranium Use by the U.S. Department of Defense," March, 1993:22.

7 Nicolson, G.L., et al, "Progress on the Persian Gulf War Illness-Reality and Hypotheses," International Journal of Occupational Medicine and Toxicology, Princeton Scientific Publishing Co., Inc, Vol. 4, No. 3 1995:365.

8. Al-Ani, N.A., "Health Consequences of D.U. Used By U.S. and British Forces," Baghdad Medical College, C.M. Department, December, 1998.

9. Socorro, New Mexico, "Depleted Uranium and Environmental Data in Socorro," City Council Chambers, Public Meeting, June 2, 1999.

10. Manufacturing Sciences Corporation, "Product From Depleted Uranium," Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

11. Parker, K., "Weapons and the Laws and the Customs of War," International Education Development/Humanitarian Law Project, San Francisco, California, May, 1997.

12. United Nations, "Resolution 1996/16," Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Geneva, Switzerland, August 2, 1996.

14. Gaines, W. and Bob Secter, "Armor-Piercing Ammo Being Sold as Surplus," Chicago Tribune, June 6, 1999.

15. Speer, A., Inside The Third Reich, Avon Books, New York, New York, September, 1971:304.

15. U.S. War Department, "Use of Radioactive Materials As a Military Weapon," letter to Brigadier General L. R. Groves, October 30, 1943.

16. Davidson, L., "Meltdown; How Dangerous were Secret Dugway Tests?" Desert News, October 9, 1999.

17. U.S. Government, "Interim Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments," October 21, 1994:17.

18. Mettler, F.A., et al, Potential Exposure in Military Operations, Institute of Medicine, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1999:1.

19. Mettler, F.A., et al, Potential Exposure in Military Operations, Institute of Medicine, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1999:2.

20. Mettler, F.A., et al, Potential Exposure in Military Operations, Institute of Medicine, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1999:72.

21. Mettler, F.A., et al, Potential Exposure in Military Operations, Institute of Medicine, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1999:72.

22. Mettler, F.A., et al, Potential Exposure in Military Operations, Institute of Medicine, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1999:vi.

23. Mettler, F.A., et al, Potential Exposure in Military Operations, Institute of Medicine, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1999:72.

24. Smith, L., "HQ OPERATION DESERT STORM MEMO," U.S. Army Armament, March 7, 1991.

25. Meissonnier, M., "La Guerre, Radioactive Secrete" Chabalier & Associates Press Agency, Capa Television, Canal +, Paris, France, 2000.

26. Al-Ani, N.A., "Health Consequences of D.U. Used By U.S. and British Forces," Baghdad Medical College, C.M. Department, December, 1998.