Nato's depleted credibility (Financial Times, 13 gennaio)

COMMENT & ANALYSIS: Nato's depleted credibility: The alliance's slow response to public anxieties about weapons used in the conflict in Bosnia has added to transatlantic tensions, write Alexander Nicoll and Stephen Fidler: Financial Times; Jan 13, 2001
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html?id=010113000448&query=uranium#docAnchor010113000448
By STEPHEN FIDLER and ALEXANDER NICOLL

Governments across Europe did not acquit themselves well this week as they struggled to deal with public anxiety about the use of weapons containing depleted uranium. A public outcry left scientific evidence behind and the issue rapidly became one of confidence in official assurances. It caused tension within the Nato alliance at a delicate time, adding another potential transatlantic time-bomb to several others as a new US administration is about to take office.

"It was a public relations defeat for the alliance," says Jonathan Eyal of the Royal United Services Institute, a London think-tank. "It came along just as Nato had managed to impose the view that its Kosovo campaign was a success because it resulted in the departure of President (Slobodan) Milosevic. Now its image as a force for good looks tarnished."

Even though they said they did not believe in links between depleted uranium and disease, Europe's governments were forced to act, launching investigations and announcing health checks. So, too, was Nato. At a crisis meeting at its Brussels headquarters on Wednesday, Lord Robertson, Nato's secretary-general, launched a "reassurance action plan" - even though, according to an official who attended it, "there was no serious claim by any of the nations that there was a link between depleted uranium and leukaemia".

Public concern about depleted uranium follows the deaths of six Italian soldiers from leukaemia after serving in Balkan peacekeeping forces. Several other countries reported leukaemia cases among soldiers who had served in the Balkans. Italy and Germany called for a ban on the weapons' use, and Norwegian soldiers refused to sign contracts for Balkan assignments. No evidence emerged, however, that sick soldiers had been exposed to uranium or that this had caused their illnesses.

Mere mention of uranium is emotive because of its use in the nuclear industry. Depleted uranium weapons are not nuclear - although they are certainly nasty. Enrichment of uranium leaves a by-product that is "depleted" - it has only 40 per cent of the radioactivity of the naturally occurring metal. This is attractive to the arms industry because exceptional hardness and heaviness make it ideal for piercing the armour of tanks, which it does with devastating effect. It is also used in the armour of some western tanks and as ballast in civil aircraft and in the keels of sailing boats.

Veterans of the 1991 Gulf war have long claimed the metal is a factor behind "Gulf war syndrome" symptoms that many of them suffer. Some 320 tonnes of depleted uranium were fired at Iraqi tanks and Baghdad claims it is the cause of illnesses and birth deformities among Iraqis.

The metal is agreed by governments and independent scientists to be hazardous. The biggest risk is that, like other heavy metals such as lead and mercury, uranium is chemically toxic. It can cause kidney problems. Radioactivity makes it dangerous if inhaled in the form of dust particles, created when the metal pulverises on impact. There is debate about possible effects. The official view is that only people in close proximity to an attack or involved in rescuing the crew of a stricken tank are at risk.

However, American soldiers who were hit by fragments or inhaled substantial amounts of dust in "friendly fire" incidents in the Gulf have not, according to the Pentagon, developed the health problems to which the uranium makes them vulnerable.

Nevertheless, some scientists believe there are considerable health risks from uranium oxides lodged in the lungs over a period of years. They also believe clouds of particles could be spread by the wind far from the area of impact, potentially putting many people at risk.

Such concerns would not explain, however, how soldiers going as peacekeepers to Bosnia could become ill with leukaemia as a result of exposure some time after the weapons were fired. Three tonnes of depleted uranium were fired in Bosnia in 1994-95 and nine tonnes in Kosovo in 1999.

Moreover, the US military has shown keen interest in particular environmental hazards that could harm its soldiers. Just yesterday the Pentagon released a report about pesticides used in the Gulf war. Depleted uranium has not been high on its list. During the Bosnia conflict, instructions were given to allied troops about how to handle tanks that had been hit.

Some experts believe Nato has only itself to blame for the suspicion in which it is held over depleted uranium. "It should have been treated like Bridgestone-Firestone or Exxon Valdez - as a real PR problem that you have to jump on right away," says Robert Hunter, senior adviser at Rand Corporation and a former US ambassador to Nato. Mr Eyal of Rusi agrees: the alliance took months to provide data to the United Nations Environment Programme on where and how much depleted uranium was used in Kosovo.

The timing of the controversy could hardly be worse. Nato's unity was tested during the Kosovo campaign and the ongoing peacekeeping effort could be put at risk if public pressure mounts and governments decide to withdraw, or refuse to contribute, troops.

Europe's efforts at developing an independent defence identity, triggered partly by military deficiencies exposed in that operation, have added to transatlantic tensions. Conservatives in Britain and the US say a planned European Union rapid reaction force will weaken Nato unity. The attitude of President-elect George W. Bush is not yet clear.

Looming as the most divisive issue is the US desire, likely to be pushed forward by Mr Bush, for a national missile defence programme. Many Europeans fear this will undermine Nato by making the US less concerned about its allies and will cause a schism between Washington and Moscow. Both Republican and Democratic security specialists in Washington recognise that, badly handled, NMD deployment could be a disaster for the alliance.

The fear at Nato headquarters is that the uranium issue, though likely to prove less damaging than NMD or the rapid reaction force, could stir up further anti-American sentiment in Europe.

The extent of the pressure on many European governments over uranium was reflected in their inept handling of the response and their desperate need of moves by Nato to provide general reassurance.

In Britain, for example, the Ministry of Defence, which was adamant there was no need for health screening of soldiers, was forced by the prime minister's office into an embarrassing reversal. Memory of the "mad cow" disease crisis, when repeated government denials about health risks were disproved, is fresh. Leaks of official documents appearing to show the MoD had covered up possible health risks fuelled the climate of cynicism and pushed ministers even further on the defensive.

Gerhard Schroder, the German chancellor, announced he had a "healthy scepticism" about the weapons even as his defence ministry issued assurances of safety.

By the end of the week, however, there were signs the uproar was abating. Several columnists in European newspapers berated their governments for craven responses to media-stoked worries, undermining morale in their own troops. The Spanish daily El Pais, for example, noted scientists had rejected a link between uranium and disease: "Before the cause-effect relation has been established, politicians and media seem to be compelled to generate more alarm in public opinion so that they can be asked to take initiatives that are as irresponsible as they are improvised."

Even if the scare abates, however, governments will again have to review how they deal with such anxieties in future.

Special report: http://www.ft.com/uranium

Copyright: The Financial Times Limited