Bruno Vitale
27 rue des Gares, 1201 Geneva
vitalebru29@hotmail.com

(the German original of this paper will be published  on WechselWirkung)
(you can make this English version freely available to your friends and campaign groups)

(if you want to reproduce and/or publish it, please contact first: Peter C. Bosetti, Redaktion WechselWirkung Stichting Vijlen Institute for Physics Rott 53, NL - 6294 NL Vijlen tel. (0031 43) 455 90 01, fax 455 23 46 WWirkung@aol.com and send me a copy)

Bruno Vitale

1. Introduction

In a recent paper on the Vietnam war and "the exceptional cruelty of a struggle that led to the death of 58,000 Americans and of more than 3 million Vietnamese", Ignacio Ramonet—the director of Le Monde Diplomatique—wrote: "Some young ‘veterans’ (20 to 27 years old) coming back from war became aware that they had been made to participate in a slaughter and through conditioning had been dehumanized and given the status of criminal ‘Terminators’. They now understand that the Vietnam war will never have its International Criminal Tribunal; and that the political and military leaders, who ordered the massacres, the spread of napalm, the aerial bombing of civilian populations, the massive executions in the prisons, and the ecological disasters provoked by the massive use of defoliants will never be judged by a Court Martial and will never be sentenced for crimes against humanity". (1)

This  horror story  will repeat itself. There will be no International Criminal Tribunal for the new crimes against humanity perpetrated by the political and military leaders of the United States (with the complicity of their British allies) who used depleted Uranium (DU) weaponry against Iraq (1991) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1999). In fact, the committee established to review the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia (ICTY) decided, in its final report, that "In view of the uncertain state of development of the legal standards governing this area, it should be emphasized that the use of depleted Uranium or other potentially hazardous substance by any adversary in conflicts within the former Yugoslavia since 1991 has not formed the basis of any charge laid by the Prosecutor ... It is therefore the opinion of the committee, based on information available at present, that the OTP should not commence an investigation into the use of depleted Uranium projectiles by NATO". (2)

It seems futile to emphasize the new wave of human and ecological suffering that this new kind of "potentially hazardous substance" will introduce into modern warfare. The simple use of traditional weapons, be they small arms or standard bombs, is quite capable of destroying human life and of making life in large regions of the world unbearable (3). But the development of new, more powerful and more efficient weapons by the powers that dominate our world is related to the development of a new, dangerous strategy: "zero-death" warfare ("zero," of course, on the side of the aggressor; the number of victims, soldiers and civilians can increase exponentially) that leaves the vanquished country with its industrial, medical, and educational structures destroyed, soil and water supplies polluted, and a sick population that no one can take care of, since the so-called "international community" would impose "sanctions" following the attack. Cluster bombs, land mines, DU weapons, ...: the terror that the deployment of such an arsenal of horrors can create should suffice to guarantee the control of the world in the "new world order". It is in this framework of analysis that I would like to develop a few considerations on the burgeoning DU weaponry.

We should be sensitive to the fact that the development of these new weapons demands a collaborative effort by the political, military, industrial, and scientific establishments; we cannot limit blame or responsibility to only one of these powerful forces in our societies. Strategic imperatives find an enthusiastic response in the dirtiest policies of international power, in the most powerful industrial interests, and in the most ambitious dreams of the scientific community (4). An active, polemical and efficient opposition to the development and deployment of a new panoply of weapons should be able to analyze and attack all of these power ingredients together; to reach this aim, we should be equipped with correct, up-to-date information and we should try to go beyond pure denunciation and moral outcry. But how? it is easy to talk, but difficult to find avenues of action.

DU weapons are, of course, only a small part of this strategy of terror. Not all nuclear states have declared explicit and unambiguous support for the principle of "no first use".(5). The massive use of defoliants by the United States during the Vietnam war has never led to any stated policy of abandoning of this kind of warfare, notwithstanding the grave, diffuse and permanent damage to people, crops, water, and the whole environment (6).

So if we now concentrate on DU weapons, it is not to ignore the global and grave responsibility the major powers bear for the terror that they exercise through the use of other sophisticated means of control and destruction, And it is not merely to protest (7). It is to better inform ourselves about a subject that deserves vigilant attention in the future, and at the same time, to give ourselves some clues about the forces and interests that shape our lives.

One last justification for this kind of reflection: We in the so-called "industrialized" (or "democratic") nations live immersed in a cloud of permanent, if hypocritical, references to "human rights". Other countries, with older social systems or tentative new economic structures, are judged by our leaders and moral censors on the basis of the defense of  "human rights". But these new weapons, inherently disrespectful of human life, human suffering and the long-range destruction of the environment, are "inhuman wrongs". Recognizing this, we citizens would relate differently to the lies of our leaders.

I have gathered much of the data discussed below from the sources listed in Table 1. I give the Contents of these references in some detail, since the interested reader might find it useful to refer directly to the original sources.

2. Depleted Uranium and the development of depleted Uranium weaponry

You can find on the Internet a very candid offer of DU manufactured objects. "Joint-Stock Company Chepetsky Mechanical Plant, Laureate of Government for Quality" presents, on its nicely designed website (http://www.chmz.udm.net/uran_eng.shtml), its "Depleted Uranium - reliable biological irradiation shielding". It takes some time to discover that the "Laureate" refers to a "Premium of Government of Russian Federation for Quality" (1998). You can even learn that "JSC ‘Chepetsky Mechanical Plant’ had no claims from the customers during all its history" and that it "is part of the Russian Federation nuclear-power complex".

What is a bit more surprising is that "Application of our depleted Uranium by your company will be an important step forward in producing first-rate articles: flaw-detectors, freight containers [!], scientific and medical equipment ... We are ready to produce the required quantity of various depleted Uranium articles in the shortest time at purchaser's request".

This "civilian" reconversion of the enormous stocks of DU produced by all nuclear countries as a byproduct of the military use of "weapon grade Uranium" and of the nuclear power-plants’ use of "enriched Uranium" (see Tables 1 and 2) is economically comprehensible, but full of dangers. The Chepetsky's web site does not mention either the extreme chemical toxicity of DU or its weak—but not negligible—radioactivity. How to protect workers from these dangers, how to handle these "first-rate articles", how to dispose of their broken or discarded parts—there is not a single word to be found on the Chepetsky web site.

However, it would be enough to glimpse through the Appendices of UNEP/UNCHS (1999) to see that these dangers are very real and reasonably well known. "As alpha and beta radiation has very limited range in tissue, the dust or particles of DU have to be inhaled or ingested to contribute to the received [radioactive] dose. In case of skin contamination through contact with solid pieces of DU, there will be some external beta radiation to the skin. ... In short-term toxicity studies it was shown that the kidney is the target organ for Uranium [chemical] toxicity" (Appendix 4).

The dangers of these civilian applications of DU are minimal, however, when compared with the dangers of the military applications in the production of weapons (8). The range of DU weaponry already available to NATO countries (U.S., British and French forces) is large: it goes from the penetrating tips and counterweights of cruise missiles to the DU rounds for the U.S. A-10 Warthog airplanes (used against tanks), the Apache helicopters, and the Harrier airplanes, and to the 120 mm cannon shells used by the U.S. M1A1 Abrams tanks, etc.

The main reason for the development of these applications (apart from the need to dispose of the thousands of tons of the very expensive "nuclear waste" stocked by all nuclear countries) lies in the very high density of DU, together with its extreme hardness when in alloys. These two characteristics make it an ideal component of hard, penetrating projectiles against both armored tanks and deeply hidden military fortifications, and at the same time a very powerful component of the shields of armored tanks.

On the other hand, the main danger of the military use of DU—to human beings, to the soil and the atmosphere, and in general to the whole ecosystem—is to be found in the chemical properties of DU. Remember that the chemical properties of all isotopes of an element are the same, so that what follows is valid as much for "natural" Uranium" as for "spent" Uranium and "depleted" Uranium; but apart from the use of "weapon grade" Uranium in the fission bomb of Hiroshima, it is only DU, and its consequences, that entire populations have recently confronted.

"When a DU bullet impacts on a hard object [as the armored plates of a tank or the concrete ceiling of a fortification], it is crushed into fragments and dust. Normally 10-35% (maximum of 70%) of the bullet becomes aerosol on impact or when the DU dust catches fire. Most of the dust particles are less than 5 microns in size, and spread according to wind direction. ... If the area attacked consists of rocks and stony soil, most of the DU will be crushed and aerosolized, and thus there will be fallout from DU dust" (UNEP/UNCHS (1999), Appendix 5). "Uranium that has leaked from fragments and dust particles of DU will be transported in the soil or the bedrock as U(2+)-ions in precipitating water. Under oxidizing conditions, most of the dissolved Uranium ions are in the form of soluble unary ions that can move through the environment and living organisms" (UNEP/UNCHS (1999), Appendix 6).

The kind and the amount of risk — to the target soldiers who survive the blast and to the civil population — depend therefore on the chemical form of the DU pollution. When the DU-polluted particles in the aerosol are soluble in water, DU enters the body by ingestion; in this case, the kidneys are the organ that is most easily and rapidly damaged by the chemical toxic effects of Uranium. When these particles are insoluble, the danger comes from the radioactive dust that, entering the lungs by respiration, deposits there and can contribute later to the development of lung cancer (9).

Michael Clark, an expert not very sympathetic with what he calls "extreme claims" against DU ("DU is not the extremely lethal danger that some would like to claim it is") states: "Any sizeable bare fragment [of DU] has appreciable contact beta dose rate, typically 2 mSv/h. ... Inhalation or ingestion of DU will incur an enhanced radiation dose internally, but the general scientific/medical consensus is that DU is more of a chemical problem than a radiological one. Ingestion of significant amounts of DU can cause kidney damage due to its chemical toxicity ..." (10).

Those who are responsible for the military deployment of DU weapons have always minimized both the chemical and the radioactive dangers that it creates for the civil population. It is therefore particularly interesting to read the "Response statement" distributed on February 15, 1999 by the U.K. Minister of Defence, after a fire broke in a Royal Ordnance factory handling DU: "On Monday morning, 8 February, a fire occurred at a Royal Ordnance Speciality Metals factory at Featherstone in Staffordshire. The factory handles depleted Uranium and there was initial concern that the fire could have led to the release of radioactivity. The emergency services therefore advised local residents to stay indoors and close the windows" (11). No warning of the sort was ever given to Iraqi or Serb civilian populations, both amply showered by DU weapons, after the bombing raids!

It is therefore evident that all of the available chemical, physical, and medical information on DU should have made it clear that the development of DU weapons would have been disastrous, and that the inevitable spreading of DU aerosols and dust on a country as a result of their military use would have led to perfectly characterized "crimes of war" and "crimes against humanity". Nonetheless, see what has been happening during the last two decades in the United States  We lack detailed information about the DU weapons’ projects of the other nuclear powers, but we can rely on their industrial-military-scientific complex to predict that they are not too different! CADU—the UK Campaign Against Depleted Uranium—is "currently attempting to research manufacture of depleted Uranium in the UK" (see their website at
http://members.gn.apc.org/~cadu).

Here are a few examples.

The development of DU weapons by the United Sates started very early. As H. Livingstone writes: "The use of DU in weapons which can be spread around the test ranges and battlefields of the world is an ingenious solution to the nuclear industry’s paralyzing problem of what to do with nuclear waste" (12). The extent of this "ingenious solution" can be judged by an official USA document relative to the decommissioning (i.e., closing) of a DU munitions test area at Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana:

"From 1984 to 1994, the licensee conducted accuracy testing of depleted Uranium (DU) tank penetrator rounds at the site ... The DU penetrate rounds vary in size but can be generally described as rods comprised of a DU Titanium alloy with a diameter of approximately 2.5 cm and a length as much as 61 cm. The DU munitions testing contaminated approximately 5,100,000 square meters (1260 acres) on the site with an estimated 70,000 kg [70 tons!] of DU ... Currently, the licensed material is kept onsite in the restricted area known as ‘Depleted Uranium Impact Area'. This area ... is located north of the firing line, and consists of approximately 12,000,000 square meters (3000 acres)" (13).

The decommissioning of this test facility does not imply that the development and testing of DU weaponry is stopped or suspended in the United States; in fact:

"The United State Air Force is reconstituting DU air-to-ground training activities at the Nellis Air Force Base in southern Nevada. The Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, 99th Air Base Wing propose to resume the employment of 30 mm depleted Uranium armor piercing incendiary rounds ... This is the only remaining air-to-ground gunnery range in the United States licensed for DU use" (14).

So much for developing and testing; the military had to have their "ground tests" in a real battle, against real people, which led to the use of DU ammunitions in both the Gulf War and the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia.

3. Utilization of depleted Uranium weaponry against Iraq during the Gulf War (1991)

DU weapons were first used openly in the Gulf War. According to the American Gulf War Veterans Association, hundreds of tons of ammunition employing DU were used against Iraqi artillery and armored vehicles (15). The veterans estimate that around 600,000 (Western coalition) troops were exposed to DU in the Gulf.

There is a growing literature concerning the "Gulf War illnesses" among soldiers of the Western alliance against Iraq, illnesses that are partly blamed on long-term effects of DU exposure. For instance:

"As a result of ‘friendly fire’ incidents during the Persian Gulf War, the [U.S.] Department of defense has reported that DU munitions struck a number of Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Abrams tanks [in addition, three Abrams tanks were intentionally destroyed to avoid enemy capture]. The friendly fire incidents killed 13 soldiers and wounded many more. The total number of soldiers wounded by DU is not known; however, the Office of the Army Surgeon General identified 22 soldiers whose medical records indicate they have embedded fragments that might be DU ... Although (the veterans) with embedded fragments have elevated urinary Uranium levels, researchers to date do not find adverse health effects that relate to radiation from DU, but several perturbations in biochemical and neuropsychological testing have been correlated with elevated urinary Uranium the clinical significance of which is unclear" (16).

There has been, on the contrary, no serious attempt to study the "adverse health effects" on the thousands of Iraqi soldiers who were directly exposed to DU bullets (if and when they have survived) and of the millions Iraqi people who have been polluted—through inhalation and ingestion—by DU aerosols and dust. It is true that the possible negative effects of DU pollution are difficult to separate from the several other health risks that now confront the Iraqi population: industrial pollution from the destruction of oil wells and refineries, lack of adequate hospital structures, difficulties in finding badly needed drugs because of the U.S. and U.K. imposed embargo, etc. A preliminary report on a "Child and maternal mortality survey, 1999" by UNICEF—jointly with the Iraq Ministry of Health—gives the "Infant and under-5 mortality rates in Iraq" as growing from 5.4% and  6.7%, respectively, in 1979–1984 to 10.8% and  13.1%, respectively, in 1994–1999 (17) .

A coordinated set of very intense international projects should be launched to estimate the level of DU pollution in Iraq, its possible adverse health effects, and the help needed by the Iraqi population. A very few international initiatives have already begun to collect information, as well as urine, blood, tooth, and hair samples from which to test the isotopic content of Uranium and therefore the possible presence of DU (18) (while there is a constant intake of "natural" Uranium by our body, and a corresponding metabolic "biological lifetime" for its elimination, there is no intake of DU from our environment except from DU weapons or from handling DU articles). They are clearly not enough. Ten years have now passed since the Gulf War; it is the moment to study in depth the long-range effects of the use of DU on the surviving soldiers and on the civilian population. Careful, well documented, reliable data could be of crucial importance for a powerful international campaign aiming at the definitive prohibition of DU weapons.

4. Use of depleted Uranium weaponry on Kosovo and Serbia during the NATO war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1999)

In a letter dated February 7, 2000 (almost one year after the beginning of NATO's bombing on Yugoslavia!), the NATO Secretary General G. Robertson confirmed to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that DU weaponry had been used by NATO:

"DU rounds were used whenever the A-10 engaged armor during Operation Allied Force. Therefore, it was used throughout Kosovo during approximately 100 missions. The GAU-8/A API round is designated PGU-13/B and uses a streamlined projectile housing a sub-calibre kinetic energy penetrator machined from DU, a non-critical byproduct of the Uranium refining process. The A-10s used DU rounds as part of their standard load. A total of approximately 31,000 rounds of DU ammunition was used in operation Allied Force. The major focus of these operations was in an area west of the Pec-Dakovica-Prizren highway, in the area surrounding Klina, in the area around Prizren and in an area to the north of a line joining Suva Reka and Urosevac. However, many missions using DU also took place outside these areas. At this moment it is impossible to state accurately every location where DU ammunition was used" (19).

News about the use of DU bombs on Yugoslavia (in particular, on Kosovo) were already to be found in the media; in particular, A. Kirby of the BBC published a number of well-documented "Scientific/Technical" news items on this topic (20). However, the United Nations Environment Program/United Nations Center for Human Settlements (UNEP/UNCHS), (Habitat) Balkans Task Force, in its preliminary assessment  of "the potential effects on human health and the environment from the possible use of depleted Uranium during the 1999 Kosovo conflict" (October 1999, five months after the end of the bombing campaign!) was still obliged to state that: "... there are no official documents confirming that depleted Uranium was, or was not, used in the Kosovo conflict". And further: "The lack of official confirmation from NATO that depleted Uranium has, or has not, been used, distorts the prerequisites of this study" (UNEP/UNCHS (1999); see also UNEP (1999) and in particular UNEP/UNCHS (1999a) for a more comprehensive analysis of the environmental consequences of the Balkans war).

So an official UN Task Force had to wait until February 7, 2000 to be informed about an important aspect of a war action that was launched in March 1999 with the consent and as part of the policy of the United Nations (this at least is the folklore knowledge instilled by the media!).

The human and environmental consequences of the use of DU weapons on Yugoslavia are still largely unknown. How much the population in Serbia and in Kosovo is aware of the dangers that it incurs by handling broken pieces of DU or in inhaling dust from sites polluted by DU explosions is unclear. The U.K. Ministry of Defense is worried, however: "There are a number of ways in which either UK troops or civilians could be exposed to DU during or after these conflicts. The most likely risk would be if people enter areas that have been damaged and contaminated by DU ammunition ... People visiting or working in Kosovo, for instance press and relief agencies [it seems that Kosovars are not considered significant ‘people working in Kosovo’], should seek advice from appropriate authorities on the disposal of damaged vehicles or areas of D.U. contamination and avoid disturbing these areas. If access to potentially contaminated areas is deemed essential, then advice should be sought from the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign Office on any protective measures required" (22). How far we are from the reassuring tone of the Harley, et al. (1999) RAND report!
 

5. Conclusions: Perspectives for action

The "concluding remarks and future research" of the "hostile witness" RAND report I have often quoted do not leave room for much optimism:

"In conclusion, the use of DU munitions and armor is likely to expand greatly over the coming years, both in the U.S. military and in other countries. It is therefore important to continue research to further our knowledge of any potential health risks that might result from different levels and pathways of exposure" (23).

And so, first you engage into a program to "expand greatly" DU weaponry, and then, if and when possible, you engage into a research program to see what could be its "health risks"!

The Chepetsky's offer of "first-rate (DU) articles", machined from Russian DU arriving from the "Russian Federation nuclear-power complex", seems to imply that we shall be confronted in the future with a market of civilian goods that will analogously "expand greatly". This too will require some vigilance and some careful watching. But the great expansion of the DU weaponry is, of course, even more of a danger. Its use in modern warfare reminds us of the very old technique of the "scorched earth" of the enemy after victory; and of the symbolic, and perhaps efficient, old technique of covering its land with salt, to make it infertile. The development of DU ammunition may have been suggested by the high density and hardness of DU, but how do we avoid suspecting that the grave consequences of their use (chemically polluted land for years, radioactively polluted land for centuries) have not played an important role in the strategic choice? Toxic aerosols and radioactive dusts are so much more efficient than salt!

Pure denunciation is of course depressing; we should do more. DU weapons do not descend on us from the sky: they are actively researched by scientists, tested by the military, produced by workers in our factories, used by soldiers in our armies. How to address the arrogance of scientists in their closed laboratories? How to address trade unions and workers, interested in saving their jobs, even when they produce napalm, or nuclear, fragmentation, or DU bombs? How to address the people around us, make them aware of what is being prepared for us all?

Depleted Uranium Education Project (1997): Depleted Uranium; How the Pentagon radiates soldiers and civilians with DU weapons. New York: IAC, 1997.

GRIP (1999): Proposition de résolution du Parlement européen, visant à interdire l'usage d'armes à u.a., présentée par P. Lannoye, groupe des Verts, June 10, 1999 (www.grip.org).

N.H. Harley, E.C. Foulkes, L.H. Hilborne, A. Hudson and C. Ross Anthony (1999): A Review of the scientific literature as pertains to Gulf War illnesses, vol.7: Depleted Uranium. RAND Corporation, 1999 (www.rand.org/publications). For details on the contents, see Table 1.

M. Mccgwire (2000): Why did we bomb Belgrade?. International Affairs (U.K.), vol.76, no. 1, January 2000.

Ministry of Defence, U.K (1999): Testing for the presence of depleted uranium in UK veterans of the Gulf conflict; The current position, 24-3-99 (www.mod.uk/policy/gulfwar).

UNEP (1999): UNEP-LED assessment of the environmental impact of the Balkans conflict concludes work in Yugoslavia. UNEP/46 Press Release, September 14, 1999.

UNEP/UNCHS (1999); The potential effects on human health and the environment arising from possible use of depleted uranium during the 1999 Kosovo conflict: A preliminary assessment. United Nations Environment Program/United Nations Center for Human Settlements, (Habitat) Balkans Task Force, October 1999 (balkans.unep.ch; with extensive appendices and a rich bibliography).

UNEP/UNCHS (1999a); The Kosovo conflict: Consequences for the environment and human settlements. United Nations Environment Program/United Nations Center for Human Settlements, (Habitat) Balkans Task Force, October 1999 (balkans.unep.ch).

VISIE (1999): Depleted Uranium hazard. Holland, 1999
(www.web-light.nl/VISIE/ud_main.html). For details on the contents, see Table 1.

WISE (2000): Uranium project. World Information Service on Energy, 2000
(www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium). For details on the contents, see Table 1.

V.S.Zajic (2000): Review of radioactivity, military use, and health effects of depleted Uranium (members.tripod.com/vzajic). For details on the contents, see Table 1.

N.H.Harley, E.C.Foulkes, L.H.Hilborne, A.Hudson and C.Ross Anthony (1999): A Review of the scientific literature as pertains to Gulf War illnesses; vol.7: Depleted Uranium. RAND corporation, 1999 (www.rand.org/publications).

This is a scientific report whose main aim seems to be to underplay the dangers of the civilian and military uses of D.U.; nevertheless, it contains quite a lot of useful information and can help in avoiding useless, catastrophic statements; the very fact that it can be taken as a "hostile witness" gives more weight to its relevant information.

Contents:
  Ch.1: Introduction
  Ch.2: Health effects
  Ch.3: Concluding remarks and future research
  Appendix A: Principal decay scheme of the Uranium series
  Appendix D: Single-particle lung dosimetry
  Appendix G: Measured deep dose rates for M60A3 and M1 tanks
  Références

VISIE (1999): Depleted Uranium hazard. Holland, 1999
(www.web-light.nl/VISIE/ud_main.html).

Contents:
  Kosovo/Yugoslavia/Netherland/UK
  J.Rendon: Concerns about DU
  Part of the Executive Summary of an internal UN report about
    the environmental consequences of the war against
    Yugoslavia
  The effects of using depleted Uranium by allied forces on men
    and the biosphere in selected regions of the southern area
    of Iraq
  Proposed independent study about depleted uranium
    contamination
  DU and other environmental impacts of the Balkans war
  Bone accumulation, lung damage; misleading scientific study
  Molecular basis for effects of carcinogenic metals on
    inducible gene expression
  J.M.Eaton: Ecological catastrophe and health hazards of the
    NATO bombing; An annotated URL referenced list of internet
    articles, news, press releases

WISE (2000): Uranium project. World Information Service on Energy, 2000
(www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium).

Contents:
  Introduction
    Uranium: its uses and hazards
  Uranium radiation and health
    Current issues
    Uranium radiation properties
    Uranium toxicity
  Uranium mining and milling
  Uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication
  Depleted Uranium
    Current issues: waste management of depleted uranium
      P.Diehl: Depleted Uranium: a by-product of the nuclear chain (Laka Foundation)
      Depleted Uranium processing and storage facilities
Civilian use of depleted Uranium
      Current issues
      Radiation exposure from denture containing Uranium
      Radiation exposure from depleted Uranium counterweights
Military use of depleted Uranium
      Current issues: depleted Uranium weapons
      H.Livingstone: Depleted Uranium weapons
      30 mm DU bullet image; GAU-8/A ammunition
      L.A.Dietz: Contamination of Persian Gulf War veterans and others by depleted Uranium
      Depleted uranium; A post-war disaster for environment and health (Laka Foundation)
      D.Fahey: Depleted Uranium weapons; Lessons from the 1991 Gulf War
      R.Bertell: Gulf War veterans and depleted Uranium
      D.Robicheau: The next testing site for depleted Uranium weaponry
      R.Bristow: Thoughts of the first British Gulf War veteran found poisoned with depleted Uranium
      F.Arbuthnot: The health of the Iraqi people
      H.van der Keur: Uranium pollution from the Amsterdam 1992 plane crash
      Organisations involved in campaigns against depleted Uranium
      Radioactive battlefields of the 1990s (The Military Toxics project)
      Radiation exposure from depleted Uranium weapons
      Uranium radiation individual dose calculator
      Bibliography: Military use of depleted Uranium
      Related information sources; Depleted Uranium Tailings dam safety; Phosphate tailings

V.S. Zajic (2000): Review of radioactivity, military use, and health effects of depleted Uranium (members.tripod.com/vzajic).

Contents:
  1. Radioactivity; 2. Origins; 3. Applications;
  4. Manufactures; 5. Ammunition testing;
  6. Combat and accidents; 7. Radiological effects;
  8. Chemical toxicity; 9. Gulf War illness; 10. Conclusions
  References

(UNEP/UNCHS (1999), Appendix 4;
www.dne.bnl.gov: Table of nuclides, Uranium;
www.nndc.bnl.gov/htbin/nudat.cgi: Decay radiations;
www.webelements.com: WebElements)

  Uranium, U
  Z (atomic number) = 92
  A (atomic weight): isotopes known from A = 218 to A = 242;
      the isotopes U[234], U[235] and U[238] are found in
      nature, the remaining 22 Uranium isotopes are
      artificially produced

"natural" Uranium, isotopic composition:

                   U[234]   .005%  lifetime 250.000 years
                   U[235]   .720%           700 millions years
                   U[238] 99.275%           4.5 millions years

Density: 17 - 19 g/cm3 (almost double of the density of Lead)

Fusion point: > 1130°

Highly toxic, like all heavy metals

Radioactivity of "natural" Uranium: when uranium ore is processed into "natural" Uranium, the decay products of U[234] and U[235] remain in the waste product; immediately after "natural" Uranium is produced, it therefore consists only of the three natural, radioactive isotopes; after a few months their daughter products will be in radioactive equilibrium with their parents. The end-products of all these radioactive processes will be stable Lead isotopes.

(Diehl, in WISE (2000); UNEP/UNCHS (1999), Appendix 4)

"depleted" Uranium (D.U.) is the residual product obtained from the production of Uranium fuel ("enriched" Uranium, containing in general more than 3.5% of U[235]) for nuclear reactors and the preparation of Uranium explosive ("weapon grade" Uranium) for nuclear bombs.

While large quantities of D.U. are obtained by the above-mentioned industrial processes, only a very limited amount of it is used in some nuclear reactors; the rest if considered as "industrial waste". In some cases, the possibility of "re-enriching" D.U. has been explored.

Its isotopic composition:

                         U[234]     .0009%
                         U[235]     .2%
                         U[238]   99.8%

However, if D.U. is produced by the recycling of "spent" Uranium extracted from nuclear reactors, it also contains some Plutonium.

Density: 19.07 g/cm3; to achieve better strength and greater resistance to corrosion, Molybdenum, Titanium or Zirconium + Tungsten alloys can be used.

Fusion point: 1130°

Highly toxic, like all heavy metals

Fast neutron absorption: better than that of Lead

Radioactivity of D.U.: the decay products of the U[238] present in D.U. form a series of radioactive elements down to U[234]; the decay product of the U[235] present in D.U. is Thorium Th[231]; the final fate of all Uranium isotopes is some stable isotope of Lead. The radioactivity of the different components of D.U. produces alpha (helium nuclei), beta (electrons), and gamma (electromagnetic) radiation, the last one being only of limited importance.

(1) "Filmer le conflit du Vietnam". Le Courrier (Geneva), 28 April 2000.

(2) ICTY (2000): Final report to the Prosecutor by the Committee established to review the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Republic of Yugoslavia, June 2, 2000, section A.ii (www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm). The whole document should be considered carefully, as it gives a blanket absolution to all possible crimes committed during the NATO war: "(The committee) has tended to assume that the NATO and NATO countries's press statements are generally reliable and the explanations have been honestly given ... The committee has not spoken to those involved in directing or carrying out the bombing campaign ... NATO has admitted that mistakes did occur during the bombing campaign; errors of judgement may also have occurred. Selection of certain objectives for attack may be subject to legal debate. On the basis of the information reviewed, however, the committee is of the opinion that neither an in-depth investigation related to the bombing campaign as a whole nor investigations related to specific incidents are justified ... On the basis of the information available, the committee recommends that no investigation be commenced by the OTP in relation to the NATO bombing campaign or incidents occurring during the campaign" (Final recommendations).

(3)  According to the ICTY — see note (2) — the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia has left at least 495 civilians killed and at least 820 civilians wounded.

(4)  I have tried to develop this analysis, which privileges the paradigm of "scientific institutions", rather than "science", in the power interplay of politics/industry/science in capitalistic societies, in three somewhat old papers: B. Vitale: The neutron bomb. End Papers, no.1, 1981-1982; Scientists as military hustlers. Radical Science Journal (Issues in radical science), no.17, 1985; Military funded research: The institution of science and the military. Current Research on Peace and Violence, 8, 65-73, 1985.

(5) See, for instance, the "NATO Alliance Strategic Concept" (www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nato), approved by the heads of state and government, April 24, 1999 (50th Anniversary Washington Summit). No "no first use" of nuclear weapons will be found in this document; on the contrary, paragraph 62 reads: "The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war ... "; paragraph 63: " ... Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance"; paragraph 64: " ... NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link".

(6)  During the Vietnam war, more than forty million liters of defoliants were spread over fields and forests; almost 2/3 of this was "Agent Orange", a mixture of two herbicides (2,4-D and 2,4,5-T), containing dioxin. As a reminder of the powerful industrial interests in modern warfare: Agent Orange was produced mainly by Dow Chemical, Monsanto, and Uniroyal. See in particular: A. Schecter: Agent Orange and the Viêt-namese. American J.of Public Health, April 1995. A dramatic, if saddening, photographic exhibition on the long-range health effects of defoliants in Vietnam has been recently touring Switzerland; see the book that accompanies the exhibition: P.Jaeggi (ed.): Quand mon enfant est né, j'ai ressenti une grande tristesse; Vietnam: Quand les armes chimiques frappent à retardement. Bâle: Lenos, 2000.

(7)  But remember the powerful Protest and survive by E.P.Thomson (London: Penguin, 1980), a booklet that played an important role during the European protests against the Cruse and Pershing missiles.

(8) Appendix 5 of UNEP/UNCHS (1999) gives precious information on the development of the military use of D.U. ammunition. See also: Military use of depleted Uranium, in WISE (2000) as well as Zajic (2000).

(9) See, for instance: Depleted Uranium. Ministry of Defence, U.K., July 1999 (www.nrpb.org.uk/D-uran.htm).

(10) Michael Clark: Depleted Uranium. Radiological Protection Bulletin, no. 218, December 1999. It should be noted that "a single day of skin contact with a 2 mSv/h source is equivalent to the maximum dose of radiation acceptable during a whole year", says an expert of the British National Radiological Protection Board quoted by The New Scientist (1 May 1999). On the other hand, "a chest X-ray has a radiation dose of about 0.02 mSv" (see Ministry of Defence, U.K. (1999), p.9, note 22); therefore, a one-hour long skin contact with such a source is equivalent to receiving almost 100 chest X-ray exposures.

(11) Ministry of Defence, U.K., February 15, 1999 (www.nrpb.org.uk/R2-99.htm)

(12) H.Livingstone: Depleted Uranium weapons, in WISE (2000).

(13) [U.S.] Federal Register, December 16, 1999; see "Decommissioning of D.U. munitions test area at Jefferson Proving Ground (Indiana)", Current issues — Depleted Uranium weapons, in WISE (2000).

(14) See "Resumption of use of D.U. rounds at Nellis Air Force Range, Nevada", Current issues — Depleted Uranium weapons, in WISE (2000).

(15) See www.gulfwarvets.com; other important sources: The Military Toxics Project: "Radioactive battlefields of the 1990s", January 16, 1996, in WISE (2000); J. Shirley: "Nukes of the Gulf War", 1996 (www.parascope.com/articles); R. Fisk: "The evidence is there; We caused cancer in the Gulf", The Independent, October 16, 1998; U.S.Defense Department: "Annual report by the Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War illnesses", November 1998 (www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/annual); Ministry of Defence, U.K. (1999); Harley, et al. (1999);  D. Fahey: "Depleted Uranium weapons; Lessons from the 1991 Gulf War", in WISE (2000).

(16) Harley, et al. (1999).

(17) "Child and maternal mortality survey, 1999: Preliminary report". UNICEF-Iraq Ministry of Health, July 1999.

(18)  An interesting and growing initiative in this direction is that of the Italian group "Un ponte per l'Irak" ("A bridge to Iraq"; www.unponteper.eu.org; ponteper@tin.it). A number of NGOs organized on August 18, 1999—at the UN headquarters in Geneva—a "Round Table" on the health situation in Iraq, mainly concerned with the presence of D.U. pollution and its consequences; a document has been published: "L'assassinat d'un peuple" ("The murder of a people").

(19) Quoted in: "Current issues: Depleted Uranium weapons, Depleted Uranium use in Kosovo", in WISE (2000).

(20) A.Kirby: BBC News, April 9, May 5, June 6, June 7, 1999.

(22) "Depleted Uranium", Ministry of Defence, U.K., July 5, 1999.

(23) Harley, et al. (1999).