The Australian, 9 febbraio
Australia's N-bomb plan
http://news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,1692338%255E421,00.html
By CAMERON STEWART and
LOUISE MILLIGAN
09feb01

THE creation of the Snowy Mountains scheme and the Australian National University were part of secret plans by Australia to build an atomic bomb during the 1940s and 50s, according to a controversial book to be  released next week.

Australia's Bid For The Atomic Bomb, by University of Newcastle academic Wayne Reynolds, also argues that the Australian government agreed to allow British nuclear tests at Maralinga because it believed they would lead to Australia acquiring the bomb.

The book, based on recently declassified documents in four continents, seeks to debunk the notion that Australia was merely a passive observer of the nuclear race during the Cold War.

It claims that successive Australian governments, from Curtin to Menzies, aggressively pursued the knowledge and technology required to build a bomb, and that Australia's efforts were stymied only by the US, which eventually cut Canberra off from allied assistance.

Reynolds argues that the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme was originally intended to host inland nuclear power stations that could give Australia the capability to build the bomb:

"The Snowy Mountains scheme was never a vast irrigation project, it was undertaken with nuclear power in mind to drive the industrialisation of Australia and provide weapons to neutralise the fear of the time -- the so-called yellow peril."

The book reveals comments made in 1949 by minister for works and housing Nelson Lemmon, who said the Snowy Mountains scheme was "an endeavour to ensure that Australia does not lag in the race to develop atomic power", and that "the power will be used for defence purposes".

Reynolds argues that the decision to establish the ANU and its Research School of Physical Sciences under Marcus Oliphant was driven primarily by a desire that Australia take a leading role in developing atomic energy. Canberra sought to develop this atomic capability in tandem with Britain, although the closeness of the co-operation between them angered the US, which did not want to see the proliferation of atomic secrets, even to close allies such as Australia.

Reynolds argues Menzies's decision in 1955 to allow British testing at Maralinga was made in the full expectation that Australia would get the bomb.

"Far from being the product of his (Menzies's) desire to please Englishmen, Maralinga was justified in terms of long-term assumptions about Australia's major regional role in empire defence," he writes.

The book also claims the decision in 1955 to build a research reactor at Lucas Heights was based largely on the need for Australia to preserve an atomic weapons option.

It reveals archival papers quoting supply minister Howard Beale as saying the plan to build a reactor was aimed at the large-scale production of power and plutonium, and that the commonwealth would retain control in order "to produce plutonium for military purposes".

Reynolds also reveals the British were deeply concerned that the 1954 Petrov affair could compromise nuclear secrets and derail atomic co-operation with Australia. Canberra's attempts to acquire the bomb foundered in 1957, when the US and Britain renewed close atomic co-operation and decided to exclude third parties such as Australia.

Melbourne University arts faculty dean Stuart Macintyre said Reynolds's book was based on substantial archival research. "It goes beyond earlier accounts of Australian strategy during the period and presents a quite different perspective on domestic politics and the literature of Australian intelligence," he said.